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Chapter 3
MGNREGS Implementations
and the Dynamics of Rural Labour
Markets
D. Narasimha Reddy, A. Amarender Reddy, Madhusudan Bhattarai,
N. Nagaraj and Cynthia Bantilan
3.1 Introduction
Recently, labour scarcity has emerged as one of the major constraints leading to an
increase in agricultural production cost in India. Therefore, in this chapter, evaluation
of differential impacts of MGNREGA on the extent of fulﬁlment of the basic enti-
tlements such as days of employment, wages and earnings and the extent of coverage
of social groups like dalits, adivasis, women members and poverty alleviation has
been done. Then, this chapter also analyze state level data by disaggregating by
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socials classes, men and women and to the factors that make a difference to the
performance. Also, some micro-level ﬁndings and alternate scenarios are presented
based on the ﬁndings based on a series of focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted
in the villages of Andhra Pradesh. The secondary data presented on agriculture and
rural labour markets are largely based on the ofﬁcial sources of data and from other
studies made on different aspects of the scheme (Reddy et al. 2014).
Though, national economy of India has been growing at a rapid pace in the past
two decades, there is a widely shared view that the increase in employment has not
been commensurate with growth in the national economy. While faster growth of
economy is beneﬁcial to various stakeholders, the employment growth is more
critical to reduce poverty in the economy. The policy initiatives directly addressing
poverty reduction may be grouped into three types. They are:
(a) Institutional measures such as strengthening organization of the poor to enable
them to acquire better capabilities like the promotion community based orga-
nizations (CBOs), provision of targeted credit, etc.
(b) Transfer payments which include direct cash transfers, pensions or indirect
transfers like subsidized food and essentials through Public Distribution System
(PDS).
(c) Provision of self-employment and wage employment programmes to the tar-
geted group of population in the economy.
The experience of welfare programmes in India shows that considerable efforts
have been made on all three modes in terms of effectiveness in their implementation
and providing wider coverage to all the needed population. Here, we concentrate on
one of the major initiatives, viz. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) of 2005, and the resultant Schemes and its implica-
tions on rural employment.
3.2 Fixation of Wages
The issue of wage rate for MGNREGS has been a subject of controversy since its
initiation as an Act in 2005, because it is not ﬁxed as a uniform daily wage rate
applicable to all states at the same level. Nor it is linked to statutory minimum
wages, which vary from State to State. Except in Himachal Pradesh, the wage
payments under MGNREGS is done in terms of piece rate linked to the ‘Standard
Schedule of Rates’ (SSRs) followed by the Public Works Departments, rather the
MGNREGA wage varies from states to state due to the local economy-related
factors. This brings-in the issues of fairness of rates, fair in time measurement,
employment hours of work, etc. Details are in Boxes 3.1 and 3.2.
One of the basic principles followed is payment of an equal level of wages to
male and female workers participating under the MGNREGA schemes. When the
Scheme was launched in 2006, an indicative wage rate of ` 80 per person day was
proposed. This meant that workers engaged under MGNREGS would be assigned
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physically measurable work equivalent to ` 80 as per the Standard Schedule of
Rates followed in the state. Later, in 2009, the indicative wage rate was raised to
` 100 per person day, further, it was agreed to revise the base wage rate of ` 100
indexed on the basis of inflation rate in each of the states over the years.
Box 3.1: Payment of Wages
Assured minimum wages and timely payment of the same are basic entitle-
ments under MGNREGS. But it turned out to be a controversial issue because
of the complexity involved. The complexity is because of the choice of the
mode of payment under MGNREGS. Except Himachal Pradesh, all states in
the country are required to pay MGNREGS wages on piece rate basis, not on
time rate or daily wages. This is the beginning of the problem. The assured
minimum wage that is ﬁxed under MGNREGS is to be realized through the
physically measurable equivalent of work. This leads to the second problem
of acceptable Standard Schedule of Rates (SSRs). The third problem is a
timely measurement of work that is done. How frequently it should be done,
who should do it and who should approve it, are the questions often raised.
Fourth problem is who should pay wages? Implementing agency or an
independent agency? How to integrate these steps? And at the end of it, how
to ensure timely payment?
For instance, Andhra Pradesh government dealt with these problems
systematically. Since the SSRs used in contract works involves machines,
these rates are not comparable to solely manual work as stipulated under
MGNREGS. The Engineering Staff College of India was commissioned by
the Government of Andhra Pradesh to make work–time–motion studies and
suggest amendments to SSRs to ensure minimum wages under MGNREGS.
The results showed that according to existing SSRs, even after a day’s work,
the wages would be only one-third to one-half of the stipulated minimum
wage under MGNREGS. Based on the study, the government of Andhra
Pradesh revised the SSRs for MGNREGS by reducing the physical quantity
by one-third to one-half. In fact, this change was accepted by the Union
MoRD and was recommended to other States to follow a similar methodol-
ogy. Still there were complaints that there were no rates in SSRs for certain
tasks like, for example, ‘tank silt’, jungle and bush clearance, etc. The state
government took the help of NGOs like Centre for Environment Concerns
(CEC) to carry further studies, particularly focused on women’s tasks in
MGNREGS works. Based on the results of these studies the SSRs were
further revised reducing the load of work to match one day’s work to mini-
mum wages.
The second problem of measurement is solved by the twin approaches of
‘single-pit’ or appropriate marking of the worksite and by ﬁxing the visit of
technical assistant on ﬁxed day in a week for each cluster and logging the
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same in the muster. Recently, there has been further technological up gra-
dation of the system by developing software to transfer measurements
through cell phone.1 The third problem of agency of payment was solved by
opting for postofﬁces and banks for payment using latest technology
including biometrics. For making the system work smoothly coordination
meetings are held between the Divisional level postal ofﬁcials and the District
level rural development ofﬁcials on a ﬁxed schedule twice a month. All this
also has been changing fast. Presently, AP has moved from payment through
postofﬁce to payment by biometric smart card system operated by O-Mass
Agency. At each Panchayat, the system is operated by a women candidate
sponsored by the village organization of SHGs. Payments are made based on
a biometric device which is linked to a bank by a cell phone. The system is
amazingly simple and the village coordinators handle up to Rs. 2 lakh a peak
payments day.2 The Technical Support Unit (TSU) of the A.P State
Employment Guarantee Council, of which the Chief Minister is the
Chairman, took direct interest and initiated a few pilot projects to test dif-
ferent models and chose the one which ensures payment in less than a week.
With a view to avoid bogus attendance and to check instances of tempering
and misuse of muster rolls, the e-Muster system has been introduced. For
smooth fund flows cross-systems, the electronic Fund Management System.
(e-FMS) has been introduced recently. This also reduces delays in payment of
wages. Likewise, kwage payments under MGNREGA has been now linked
with Aadhaar numbers in 300 Direct Beneﬁt Transfer (DBT) districts which
will eliminate ghost beneﬁciaries and for a faster disbursement of wages.
Under this new plan, wage payments will be routed directly into the accounts
of the beneﬁciaries using electronic transfer systems.
1It is called Electronic Muster Measurement System (e-MMS). Under this system the Village
Assistant records measurement every day and transfers the ‘e-muster’ through cell phone. The
Technical Assistant takes the measurements every week and transfer the ‘e-measurement’ data to
the mandal by cell phone. The Engineering Consultant (two or three for each mandal) makes
‘e-check measurement’ and the Mandal Programme Ofﬁcer acts as the ‘e-muste veriﬁcation ofﬁ-
cer’ with power to verify and consolidate the information.
2The person chosen is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Village Organization of SHGs. Often she
is also an MGNREGS worker. She is paid a commission of Rs. 500 per Rs. 1 lakh.
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Box 3.2: Wage Determination and Work Measurement Issues in Group
Basedworks
A peculiar problem was observed in Rajasthan. Usually large numbers of
workers were present at worksites, up to 50–70 persons and they were further
divided into teams to undertake tasks (Khera 2008). Gender and caste-related
issues surfaced in some cases. It was found that only some members of the
group worked, while others shirked, assuming they would be paid anyway.
As a result of this one could ﬁnd 70 year olds and even some college students
at the worksite during their summer holidays, not undertaking work but
merely hanging around. In Tonk district were found some people playing
cards at the worksite. Moreover, members of dominant communities such as
Gujjar and Jat did not work, but threatened associates and ofﬁcials to mark
their attendance so that they could claim wages.
But there is also evidence to the contrary. In Andhra Pradesh, there were
three instances where weak, elderly and female workers were allowed lighter
tasks. Lactating mothers were also allowed to break in order to breastfeed. In
these cases, wages were shared equally by consensus among the groups.
However, there were also cases where male labourers in a mixed group did
not work hard, making women to do much of the work, and leading to female
labourers preferring to work without men in their groups. The programme
ofﬁcer in charge of NREGA in Tonk District mentioned that they were
experimenting by trying to make separate groups for males and females, but
often this too was not preferred.
One of the reasons for low daily wages in Rajasthan is crowding at
worksites. In one instance in Nadri Panchayat of Tonk District, an area with
hard soil and rock, after the division of wages among workers, only Rs. 1 per
day accrued to each of them due to the large number of workers, suboptimal
work output and the outdated schedule of rates (SOR), specifying quantum of
work to be completed to earn minimum wages. On the contrary, in another
village where the numbers of ‘sitting’ labourers were few in number, wages
were above Rs. 80.
Source Reddy et al. 2010.
Table 3.1 presents information on the average wage rate paid per person per day
under MGNREGA scheme from 2006–07 to 2011–12. The average wage rates are
derived by dividing the total MGNREGA wage expenditure in the state by the
person days of employment provided in the state in the year concerned. The derived
wage rate per person may not be adequate to conclude whether the concerned state
is doing better or worse in terms of supplementing the earnings of rural households
through the scheme. A better indicator is the total earnings per household under the
scheme, which depends not only on the wage level but also the number of days of
employment provided for the concerned year.
In almost all states, there has been a rise in money wage rates. But, given the fact
that there has been a very high rate of inflation during these years, it would be more
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Table 3.1 Average wages earned per person day and average annual earnings per household
under MGNREGS during 2008–09 to 2011–12
Sl. No. States MGNREGS average
level of wages per day
(`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
2006–
07
2007–
08
2008–
09
2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
1 Andaman and
Nicobar
– – 124 144 185 174
2 Andhra
Pradesh
86 83 83 92 100 101
3 Arunachal
Pradesh
48 – 59 69 95 91
4 Assam 67 72 77 87 107 130
5 Bihar 70 70 85 98 101 133
6 Chandigarh – – 0 0 0 0
7 Chhattisgarh 62 68 73 82 104 120
8 Dadra &
Nagar Haveli
– – 1 112 116 0
9 Daman & Diu – – 0 0 0 0
10 Goa – – 0 95 139 161
11 Gujarat 56 63 68 89 97 112
12 Haryana 97 115 120 151 169 180
13 Himachal
Pradesh
69 71 99 110 127 123
14 Jammu and
Kashmir
69 70 68 93 113 124
15 Jharkhand 79 82 90 98 103 120
16 Karnataka 67 72 81 86 144 189
17 Kerala 121 118 120 121 133 147
18 Lakshadweep – – 80 112 138 152
19 Madhya
Pradesh
60 63 73 84 98 122
20 Maharashtra 104 84 75 94 134 165
21 Manipur 75 81 78 78 93 125
22 Meghalaya 73 88 70 79 100 114
23 Mizoram 94 102 109 104 116 116
24 Nagaland 66 100 81 103 103 118
25 Odisha 53 76 92 106 96 123
26 Puducherry – 79 76 91 116
27 Punjab 94 100 111 124 130 145
28 Rajasthan 51 61 88 87 75 90
(continued)
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appropriate to examine whether there has been any improvement in real wages
realized under the scheme by deflating the money wages by Consumer Price Index
for Rural Labour. Such an exercise is done by taking the national average wage rate
per person day during the past 6 years and the results are presented in Fig. 3.1. It is
clear from the results that though money wage rates have been rising over the years,
the real wage rates have been virtually stagnant. But, if there were a decision to
index the MGNREGS wage rate with the national inflation, there would have been a
steep decline in real wage payments under the MGNREGS.
Table 3.1 (continued)
Sl. No. States MGNREGS average
level of wages per day
(`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
Average
level of
wages per
day (`)
2006–
07
2007–
08
2008–
09
2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
29 Sikkim 87 88 92 95 100 117
30 Tamil Nadu 80 78 80 72 82 92
31 Tripura 60 71 86 101 103 118
32 Uttar Pradesh 56 90 99 99 105 120
33 Uttarakhand 72 73 85 99 102 127
34 West Bengal 70 79 78 90 107 138
All states 64 74 84 90 100 117
Note For 2006–07 and 2007–08 average wage rates per person day refer to ﬁrst phase districts only
Source 1. Kannan and Jain (2011) for 2006–07 and 2007–08
2. http://www.nrega.nic.in
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3.3 Impact of MGNRGA on Employment, Earning
and Poverty
The overall performance of the scheme as a measure of social protection depends
on not only ensuring better wages but also on achieving the objective of ensuring
that more households are brought under the fold of hundred days of employment, at
least as per the demand in the local areas. Table 3.1 shows that there is no state
which had provided 100 days of employment even to 50% of the participating
households in 2011–12.
Tripura, Mizoram and Manipur are the only states where at least one-third of the
households had obtained 100 days of employment, but the size of their economy is
very small compared to the economic size of the other major states of India. Of the
other ﬁve states, which have reached more than 10%, three of them are Nagaland,
Meghalaya and Sikkim. Among the large scale of States, only Andhra Pradesh
(17.8%) and Maharashtra (11.3%) have achieved 100 days of employment per
household crossing two digit levels under the MGNREGA programme activities.
The overall performance of providing employment under the scheme shows a
tendency towards deceleration in recent years. The macro-picture of the average
person days of employment captured in Fig. 3.2 shows a clear downward trend. An
attempt is made here to estimate the impact of the earnings under the MGNREGS
across the states. State-speciﬁc estimates of annual earnings of participating
households are derived by dividing the total wage expenditure under MGNREGA
work by the average person days of employment per participating household.
Comparing the average household earnings from the scheme with the state-speciﬁc
estimates of rural household poverty threshold expenditure would indicate the
possible extent of the impact of the MGNREGS on rural poverty.
Table 3.2 provides the results of these estimates. For the country as a whole, the
earnings from the scheme are a little over 12% of the poverty threshold income.
These results suggest that in all those cases where the poverty gap is relatively low,
there would have been a substantial reduction in rural poverty. Perhaps the steep
decline in rural poverty in Tripura from 44.5% in 2004–05 to 19.8% in 2009–10
could be substantially attributed to MGNREGS.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Average Person Days
of Employment per
Household
Fig. 3.2 National average
person days of employment
per household. Source http://
www.nrega.nic.in
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Table 3.2 Impact of MGNREGS on rural poverty (2009–10)
Sl. No. States Average earnings per
household under
MGNREGS (`)
2009–10
Rural household
poverty threshold
income
MGNREGS earnings of %
of poverty threshold
income
1 Andhra
Pradesh
6032 41,580 14.5
2 Arunachal
Pradesh
1711 46,420 3.7
3 Assam 2982 41,500 7.2
4 Bihar 2687 39,336 6.8
5 Chhattisgarh 4228 37,038 11.4
6 Gujarat 3272 43,500 7.5
7 Haryana 5695 47,496 12.0
8 Himachal
Pradesh
6276 42,480 14.8
9 Jammu and
Kashmir
3573 43,374 8.2
10 Jharkhand 4834 36,398 13.1
11 Karnataka 4874 37,764 12.9
12 Kerala 4284 46,518 9.2
13 Madhya
Pradesh
4659 37,914 12.3
14 Maharashtra 4814 44,622 10.8
15 Manipur 5681 52,260 10.9
16 Meghalaya 3901 41,214 9.5
17 Mizoram 9872 57,000 19.4
18 Nagaland 8987 61,008 14.7
19 Odisha 4196 34,026 12.3
20 Puducherry 1708 38,460 4.4
21 Punjab 3504 49,800 7.0
22 Rajasthan 6027 45,300 13.3
23 Sikkim 7625 43,734 17.4
24 Tamil Nadu 3912 38,340 10.2
25 Tripura 8028 39,804 20.2
26 Uttar
Pradesh
6458 39,822 16.2
27 Uttarakhand 3455 43,170 8.0
28 West
Bengal
4029 38,592 10.4
All India 4870 40,368 12.1
Note Average earnings, per household under MGNREGS is derived by dividing the total wage expenditure by
average person days of employment per household
1. Calculated on the basis of the state-speciﬁc poverty line threshold expenditure for 2009–10 based on the
Tendulkar Committee revision and assuming household as comprising ﬁve consumption units
Source 1. http://www.nrega.nic.in
2. Upscportal.com for State-Speciﬁc Poverty Lines
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The highest impact on households’ earning is seen in Tripura state, where the
household earnings from MGNREGS are as high as a little over 20% of the poverty
threshold income. Mizoram is another high-performing state with the share as high
as 19.4%. The performance of some of the relatively backward states like Odisha,
Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan was better than the national average.
But, Bihar still lags much behind, which is also reflected in no decline in rural
poverty in the state, which continued to be as high as 55% in 2009–10, the almost at
same level of poverty as it was in 2004–05.
3.4 Impact of MGNREGS on Rural Labour Markets
3.4.1 Evidence from Across the Country
The search for information on the impact of MGNREGS on agricultural labour
markets leads to some evidence on labour shortage, changes in wages, mecha-
nization, peak season adjustment of work or adoption of MGNREGS calendar and
migration. The available information, however, is sketchy and uneven across the
regions. The implementation experiences also vary widely across the states. Yet
some broad trends can be discerned.
With the exception of a few well-endowed regions, the pre-existing labour
market in agriculture is characterized by surplus labour, low wages, high male–
female wage differentials, and non-implementation of statutory minimum wages.
The introduction of MGNREGS, with minimum and equal wages for male and
female workers, has, in fact, brought not only an increase in the overall agricultural
wages, but also reduction in the male–female wage gap of agricultural labour
operation. For instance, agricultural wage increases were reported in a number of
states right from Punjab and Haryana to Gujarat to West Bengal (Banerjee and Saha
2010). Even in tea gardens of Silchar, wage hikes are attributed to MGNREGS
implementation in the state. That higher wages in the MGNREGS will divert
workers from agriculture and create shortages of labour in agriculture is a theo-
retically valid proposition but the extent to which it will happen is an empirical
question (Papola 2005).
This question assumes importance especially in the context where still sub-
stantial underemployment does prevail in rural areas. The earlier Maharashtra
experience with the Employment Guarantee Scheme did put upward pressure on
agricultural wages but there was no clear evidence of shortage of labour (Acharya
1990; Datt 1994). In agriculturally well-endowed regions, the level of agricultural
wages was higher even before the MGNREGS was launched, where peak season
labour demand was met by seasonal in-migration of labour from labour-surplus
regions. The impact of MGNREGS on agricultural wages in such areas was not
much, except in pockets where the migrant labour flow declined.
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In the villages, most of the forward caste and large farmers are of the opinion
that MGNREGS is the main reason for the labour shortage. While agricultural
labourers and Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribe (SC/ST) communities are of the
opinion that out-migration and work opportunities in non-farm sector are opening
labour market for higher wage employment, and thereby they are demanding higher
wages for agricultural sector. Hence, shortage of labour is not same for the farmers
and agricultural labourers, and also among different social groups.
Recently, several previous studies in India have pointed out labour shortage not
only in agriculture but also in non-agricultural activities that depend on rural casual
labour.3 These studies were from many states like Andhra Pradesh, Punjab,
Haryana, UP and Tamil Nadu have pointed out that after the introduction of
NREGA, there has been a shortage of labour during harvesting of crops like wheat
and rice.4 Labour shortage is also reported during peak paddy sowing season in
Punjab,5 and apple harvesting season in Himachal Pradesh.6
There are reports as to how with the shortage of labour, the bargaining power of
migrant labour in Punjab had increased to the extent of not only raising wages but
also in improvement in working conditions. One study in Punjab even reported
‘Besides the TV, cooler, freshly cooked food and accommodation, the labourers are
now welcome to live in the houses of farm-owners and not in some dilapidated
tube-well room out in the farm. Wages have gone up threefold in some of these
places. Farmers say seasonal payment of wages has increased from a mere ` 1,750
to `.5,000–`. 6,250 per ha, in just about two years’.7
While farmers of these regions of Punjab (and other developed states) tend to
blame implementation of MGNREGS in labour-surplus states like Bihar, U.P and
Jharkhand, the Commissioner of Punjab Agriculture has a different explanation:
‘Earlier, the labour force used to come to Punjab sometime by end of March, at the
beginning of the harvesting season of wheat, and would stay there till paddy sowing
operation was complete by end of July. This assured them ample opportunity of
work for nearly four months. But increased mechanization of farm operations,
especially in harvesting and threshing of wheat, has reduced the duration of
employability for the migrant rural in Punjab, and predictability of the workforce
migration to Punjab from Bihar has shown a dwindling trend from 2006–07 to
2011–12’.8
3“Aspirations within Misery: Labour Shortage in Agriculture”, Sanhati, August 5, 2008.
4“NREGS lures labourers away from ﬁelds”, The Pioneer, May 4, 2010.
5‘Labour shortage affects paddy harvest’, The Hindu, September 23, 2010.
6‘Sugar mills go high-tech to beat labour shortage’ Business Standard, August 14, 2011.
7“Farmers of Tamil Nadu, Andhra show the way”, The Hindu, June 6, 2011.
8http://www.researchandmarkets.co/research/d5e163/indian_tractor-ind
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3.4.2 Impact on Farm Mechanization
Recently, many studies have suggested that the shortage of labour in agriculture can
be met by increased pace of farm mechanization. Farmers in the many villages of
Gangetic belt of Uttar Pradesh (UP) have decided to go for mechanized harvesting
of the wheat crop due to shortage of rural labour forces.9 They have attributed the
labour shortage to implementation of MGNREGS.
The use of combined harvesters for paddy harvesting in Pondicherry is also
attributed to labour shortage resulting from the implementation of the
MGNREGS.10 Mechanization of sugarcane harvesting in Maharashtra and provi-
sion of heavy subsidies to harvesting machines are also shown as a consequence of
MGNREGS.11 In Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka mechanization of
paddy transplantation are promoted by providing subsidies on the machines.12 Even
in West Bengal, mechanization is being promoted to beat rising labour costs (Babu
et al. 2010).
An interesting report on the signiﬁcant rise in the tractor market in India in recent
years has cited shortage of agricultural labour as one of the explanations for the
need of speedy mechanization.13 There is a danger that these reports could be read
as if the MGNREGS is responsible for mechanization of Indian agriculture. It is a
fact that introduction of combined harvesters, sugarcane harvesting machines and
paddy transplanters have long preceded MGNREGS.
Some of these mechanization processes themselves, as observed by the
Commissioner of Agriculture of Punjab cited above, disturbed the stable stream of
labour supply. Tightening of agricultural labour market along with the state policy
of subsidizing farm machinery ownership by farmers has been hastening agricul-
tural mechanization, especially in agriculturally better-endowed regions, and the
regions that are performing better in agriculture in the recent past.
Overall, the pace of growth rate in farm mechanization is faster in almost all the
crops and states between 1997 and 2010 (Table 3.3). Growth rates in farm mech-
anization were above 10% per annum for paddy in Odisha and MP; for chickpea in
UP; for cotton in AP and Karnataka; for maize in AP and Rajasthan.
The medium growth rate (from 5% to 10%) was observed for maize in Bihar; for
chickpea in Haryana; for cotton in MP, Haryana, TN; for paddy in WB, UP, Bihar;
for wheat in Bihar and MP. In the case of sugarcane, no state recorded more than
5% growth in farm mechanization. The growth rate in farm mechanization in
9The Financial Express, August 11, 2008 and The Asian Age, July 18, 2011.
10“Agriculture Ministry wants MGNREGA labour glitch uprooted”, The Pioneer, July 24, 2011.
11A very detailed report on how male members of the household migrate to high paying factory
work and women and elderly take to NREGS is reported as “MNREGS fails to curb distress
migration in parts of Rajasthan”, Business Standard, August 14, 2011.
12D.S. Rawat, Secretary General, ASSOCHAM in India Infoline News Service, June 26, 2011.
13D.K. Nair, Secretary General, Confederation of Indian Textile Industry (CITI) in SME Times,
April 28, 2011.
82 D. Narasimha Reddy et al.
T
ab
le
3.
3
M
ac
hi
ne
la
bo
ur
(R
s/
ha
)
tr
ie
nn
iu
m
en
di
ng
20
10
St
at
e
M
ai
ze
C
hi
ck
pe
a
C
ot
to
n
Pa
dd
y
W
he
at
Su
ga
rc
an
e
T
ot
al
A
P
20
94
(1
1.
51
)
18
38
(1
2.
69
)
18
94
(0
.4
6)
14
75
(−
4.
01
)
18
29
(4
.4
1)
B
ih
ar
15
09
(6
.1
3)
17
70
(1
.8
1)
15
64
(9
.1
4)
19
83
(6
.0
6)
30
91
(1
.0
4)
20
76
(5
.4
8)
G
uj
ar
at
19
93
(2
.5
2)
29
52
(3
.0
4)
24
73
(2
.8
2)
H
ar
ya
na
20
24
(6
.1
9)
24
04
(7
.4
6)
38
24
(3
.9
5)
52
84
(4
.0
5)
11
43
(0
.4
)
29
39
(4
.2
4)
K
ar
na
ta
ka
15
10
(4
.6
4)
96
4(
14
.5
3)
18
72
(0
.4
6)
14
47
(2
.9
6)
M
ah
ar
as
ht
ra
11
11
(4
.6
6)
71
34
(4
.2
1)
41
22
(4
.2
8)
M
P
70
2(
4.
75
)
22
26
(4
.2
2)
66
3(
8.
44
)
10
23
(1
1.
19
)
28
08
(5
.2
5)
14
88
(5
.0
0)
O
di
sh
a
74
2
74
2
Pu
nj
ab
45
25
(3
.0
3)
48
52
(2
.0
1)
55
07
(4
.5
7)
49
61
(3
.2
5)
R
aj
as
th
an
18
30
(1
3.
97
)
15
76
(3
.5
4)
18
03
(3
.3
)
33
99
(1
.6
9)
21
52
(3
.8
7)
T
N
31
26
(7
.3
5)
14
49
(3
.0
2)
23
00
(3
.4
2)
U
P
17
56
(4
.9
3)
25
38
(1
1.
31
)
24
82
(6
.0
7)
11
11
(2
.7
5)
19
72
(6
.5
8)
W
B
12
79
(7
.1
0)
12
79
(7
.1
0)
T
ot
al
16
10
(7
.4
2)
19
86
(5
.4
1)
20
51
(4
.8
4)
22
00
(4
.2
2)
38
40
(3
.9
8)
23
86
(1
.0
4)
23
24
(4
.2
3)
N
ot
e
Fi
gu
re
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s
ar
e
A
C
G
R
(%
)
m
ac
hi
ne
la
bo
ur
fr
om
19
97
to
20
10
So
ur
ce
D
iff
er
en
ce
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n
of
G
O
I
3 MGNREGS Implementations and the Dynamics of Rural Labour Markets 83
agricultural lagging states like Odisha, WB, UP, Bihar and MP were much higher
than other states, which could be due to counting of growth rate from a lower base
in these lagging states.
3.4.3 Adjustment Work Calendar of MGNREGA
to Local Conditions
One of the local demand by farmers across the several places in India is to manage
peak season agricultural labour demand by suspending MGNREGS work during
peak farming seasons of sowing, transplanting and harvesting of paddy and wheat.
Such a measure would not only help farmers to avoid labour shortage but also help
workers to get more days of employment by way of peak season agricultural
employment in farming, as well as, the lean season of employment from
MGNREGS work. To address these public voices, in a number of states, the local
Panchayat bodies were allowed, by mutual consent between farmers and agricul-
tural workers, to work with a crop calendar that avoids commencement of
MGNREGS work in peak farming season in the location.
This is also to ensure that it is implemented in the lean season only.14 Such a
calendar of work scheduled has been practiced even in the context of tea gardens in
West Bengal, as one executive observed: ‘The Government would do well, and it
would be a win-win situation for all, if they keep MGNREGS work between
November and March when we do not need the workers that way, even workers can
make more money’ (Bhagat 2010). The recent initiatives by the Union Ministry of
Agriculture and the Planning Commission appear to be towards making such an
MGNREGS calendar as an ofﬁcial part of the implementation of the programme.15
For improving convergence with the other government rural development related
departments (line agencies) and thereby to improve the quality of assets and
infrastructure created under the MGNREGS, the State Convergence Plans have
been formulated in many of the states.
There is also a focus from the present government in the centre on ensuring
access to water to each agriculture farm by converging resources available under
various rural development programmes such as water harvesting, conservation and
management activities like MGNREGA, Integrated watershed Management
Programme (IWMP) Command Area Development & Water Management
(CAD&WM), Repair, Renovation & Restoration of water Bodies (RRR), etc.
Accordingly, a comprehensive plan based on all available information on water
sources, distribution network, water bodies, new potential for augmentation, efﬁ-
cient management system, etc., have been contemplated under Pradhan Mantri
14Fibre 2 Fashion (online) August 14, 2011.
15SME Times, May 7, 2011.
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Krishi SinchaiYojana (PMKSY), as lunched late 2014, when the new government
came to power in New Delhi in mid of 2014.
3.4.4 Asset Creation in Rural Areas
Although asset creation is not the primary aim of the MGNREGA scheme, in the
recent years, asset creation related issues of the programme are gaining importance
in public discourses. Recently, the Government of India and many other scholars
working on rural development issues have proposed that at least 60% of the works
to be taken up in a district in terms of cost shall be for the creation of productive
assets directly linked to agriculture and allied activities through development of
land, water and trees. It is proposed that the wage-material ratio for works taken up
by agencies other than Gram Panchayat would be counted at the district level, and
not at block level as practiced until now to facilitate for taking more durable assets
under the MGNREGS programme (Government of India, Ministry of Rural
development, Rajya Sabha, Unstirred question No-2044, answered on 16.03.2015,
Performance of MGNREGA).
Likewise, for improving convergence with other line departments, and thereby to
improve the quality of assets created under the MGNREGS programme, the State
Convergence Plans need to be formulated. As noted earlier, there is a focus on
ensuring access to water to each agriculture farm by converging resources available
under various programmes undertaking water harvesting, conservation and man-
agement activities like integrated watershed programmes, command area develop-
ment programmes, etc. Accordingly, a comprehensive plan based on all available
information on water sources, distribution network, water bodies, new potential for
augmentation, efﬁcient management system, etc., is contemplated under Pradhan
Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana (PMKSY), or is also called as Prime Minister
Irrigation Plan. The impact of the programme (MGNREGS) is visible in many
states in terms of increased water tables, reduction of fallow lands and increased
land productivity, after the wider spread implementation of the MGNREGS.
3.4.5 Migration
By default on design of the programme, the MGNREGS, by ensuring work for
hundred days at an assured minimum wage at the place of residence under the
MGNREGS act in 2005, was expected to have a substantial impact on the reduction
of distress migration. Though there are no studies yet in estimating the extent of
decline in distress migration because of MGNREGS, there are a number of studies,
which gathered the impression of participants on the impact of MGNREGS on
migration.
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The responses vary from state to state and between districts within a State. The
available responses from these surveys from Uttarakhand (Singh and Nauriyal
2009), Odisha (Nayak), Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka (Kamath 2008), Tamil
Nadu (IITM 2009) and Sikkim and Meghalaya (2009) show, by and large, there has
been a sharp decline in distress migration, after successful implementation of
MGNREGS in the places of these states, where the studies were carried out.
A study of select villages of Dhenkanal (Odisha), Bastar (Chattisgarh), Khunti
and Gumla (Jharkhand) districts shows that earlier due to lack of employment
opportunities within the villages, there was out-migration of large number of rural
forces to agriculturally more advanced states like Punjab and Haryana (Banerjee
and Saha 2010). The marginal and small farmers depended mostly on wage labour
income, with very little earnings from the income from their farm operation, due to
low yields in agriculture.
The commencement of MGNREGA works has ensured not only employment in
their native places, but also afforded them an opportunity to save their labour forces
for investment in their own farming activities that have resulted in higher yields. As
a result, though out migration of labour has not been stopped entirely from these
regions; the incidence of seasonal out-migration has come down sharply in the
recent days.
A study with a speciﬁc focus on the impact of MGNREGS on Scheduled Tribes
in Kandhamal and Koraput districts of Odisha shows that distress migration among
the ST communities has declined by 72.5% among males and by 45.5% among
females, after implementation of the programme activities in the states. And also,
the average duration of migration of a labour household declined from 69 days in
2004–05 to 23 days per worker in 2001–12 (Rao et al. 2010). But a study of Purulia
and Jalpaiguri in West Bengal shows only a marginal impact of MGNREGS on
addressing distress migration, where the average number of days of migration
declined only by about 10% (Babu et al. 2010). A study of ﬁve districts in Bihar
ﬁnds that there was not much of incidence of migration in Siwan and Begusarai.
Whereas, in Madhubani district, with an incidence of as high as 50% of
out-migration of labour forces, only 11% felt that there was any signiﬁcant impact
of MGNREGS on rural labour wage markets. (Rao and Dheeraja 2010).
There are interesting instances of return migration of marginal and small farmers
of Barmer district of Rajasthan who migrated to neighbouring Gujarat, Punjab and
Haryana as wage labour due to water scarcity and depletion of groundwater
(Paliwal 2011). In Barmer district, 47,779 ‘tankas’ (small well-like structures made
of concrete, cement and sand) and other water works were constructed under
MGNREGS to collect rain water which improved groundwater table that enabled
crop cultivation. The improved water supply has brought the small and marginal
farmers back to agriculture from the seasonal labour work in other states.
Of course, migration is not a linear phenomenon, nor is its outcomes binary like
good or bad. The impact would depend on the nature and context of migration. One
study shows that improved irrigation facilities, soil conservation, and increase in
area cultivated and crop diversiﬁcation resulting in more employment-reduced
migration by 60% in Sidhi district of Madhya Pradesh (CSE 2008a, b).
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Reports from Dungarpur, Udaipur and Rajsamand districts show that rural men
continue to migrate to factory work in Mumbai, Udaipur and Gujarat. In all these
cases, the wages in these activities are higher than that of MGNREGS, and the
duration of employment is for longer periods. These can hardly be called distress
migration. From these households while men migrate for high-wage and relatively
long duration non-agricultural work, women and elderly remain in the village to
take to MGNREGS work, which certainly is an addition to overall household
income. Nevertheless, to call this as a ‘failure to curb distress migration’ is
misleading.16
The positive impacts of MGNREGS in reducing distress migration are evident in
the reports from non-farm activities like textiles, jute mills, and a large number of
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The textile industry is dependent on migrant
workers especially from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Odisha. Since schemes like
MGNREGS provide livelihood to workers nearer home, it discourages labour
migration from catchment areas to production centres. However, this cannot be read
as the cause for labour shortage although it adds to the difﬁculties in mobilizing
‘additional workforce’ needed in this sector. The growth projections of the textile
industry also earlier suggested that the labour demand would increase from the
about 35 million in 2011–12 to 47 million by 2015.
Most of the workers earning about Rs. 7,000 a month are migratory in nature.
They move from the agricultural sector to cities after the sowing season for half of
the year, and get back to village when the harvest season starts. The MGNREGS is
seen as discouraging migration of unskilled labour from rural to urban areas. but,
there is no evidence that migration of labour for works that ensure higher wages and
longer duration was discouraged by the implementation of MGNREGS in the rural
areas.
The Secretary General of Confederation of Indian Textile Industry (CITI)
observes that the problem in the textile industry is not losing workers, but the
industry is not getting additional workers, especially skilled workers. ‘The chal-
lenge will be to ﬁnd enough workers and to train them. Though the training needs
are neither complicated nor time consuming, the magnitude of the requirements
would make it a herculean task’. Within the textile industry, it is claimed that jute
mills in West Bengal pay the maximum daily wages with a fresher getting Rs.
227 per day and a skilled worker Rs. 404. These wages are two to four times
MGNREGS wages.
Therefore, it is a widely held claim among many industrials and related stake-
holders of jute mills there that shortage of labour in jute mills is due to MGNREGS,
since MGNREGS activities in the villages have discouraged agricultural workers to
16It is reported that the draft proposal by the Planning Commission submitted to the Ministry of
Rural Development suggests rechristening the Scheme as MNREGS-II so as to cover agricultural
activities like sowing, harvesting, soil and compost preparation, irrigation and allied activities like
tending livestock. It is also proposed that to begin with the farm activities will be allowed under
the revised Scheme only in 2000 backward blocks, with a goal of putting back small-marginal
farmers on their own farms. (The Pioneer, August 19, 2011 and Tehelka, August 20, 2011).
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migrate from rural to urban areas. However, this does not reflect a true situation of
migration behaviours of rural population. Similarly, the Indian Industries
Association (IIA), Ghaziabad Chapter, has also reported that MGNREGS as the
main culprit for labour shortage in small and medium industries in India now.
Moreover, there are also several evidences and case studies from ﬁeld across the
places in India that migration for high-wage employment, especially male members
of the household has not declined even after implementation of MGNREGS across
India, but only distress migration of women and other vulnerable groups.
3.4.6 Youth and Educated
Educated and unemployed youth were more interested to migrate to work in urban/
non-agricultural works, even though there are opportunities to work in agriculture
and MGNREGA. They are attracted neither to agricultural work nor to MGNREGA
works. It is due to laborious nature and also due to low social status attributed to
such agricultural work. Besides, a small farmer (especially youth) is not interested
in agriculture because of the low income and insecurity of return from the land.
Farmers and rural youth are concerned that the hard work they put in agriculture
may go waste, if there are natural calamities like drought, hail storms, frost, and
insect-pest and disease infestations. Penetration of electronic media in the rural
areas has changed the attitude of the youths and turned them against agriculture.
Their interest in agriculture is further waning, because of low expected returns from
agricultural produce. Youth of the village do not want to work in agriculture and
MGNREGA works, because it is strenuous work for long durations and is a low
paid job if opportunities exist outside. Hence, MGNREGS has less impact on
stopping the migrant labour who moves for higher wage rates.
In short, the review of evidence shows that MGNREGS has certainly provided
dent on following aspect of rural livelihoods.
(i) reduced distress migration among rural poor,
(ii) smoothened rural consumption in the lean season,
(iii) set high standards and transparency in doing rural development even in
hinder-land villages,
(iv) addressed underemployment problem in vast tract of rural India,
(v) created assets that improved livelihoods of rural poor,
(vi) gave boost to the ﬁnancial inclusion
(vii) strengthened activities and functions of Gram Panchayats
(viii) improved the wage levels in rural areas and thereby increasing the income
levels of the poorest of poor
(ix) set standards for decent working conditions and
(x) Helped in bringing fallow lands into cultivation.
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In fact, the MGNREGS programme has also faced several challenges on its
implementations such as,
(i) delays in payment of wages
(ii) corrupt practices in implementation
(iii) denial of entitlements
(iv) poor technical capacity to implement large number of works and
(v) poor quality of assets created.
3.5 Impact of MGNREGS on Rural Labour Market
in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh
One of the major and direct impacts of MGNREGS in rural Telangana and Andhra
Pradesh, as in many other parts of the country, is felt in the rural labour market.
Based on the series of focus group discussions (FGDs) spread over a fairly large
number of villages (77), Table 3.4 presents some broad indicators of the change in
the rural labour market as a result of implementations of MGNREGS in those
villages. These indicators have to be interpreted in all their nuances to the extent the
FGDs could capture them.
Table 3.4 Impact of MGNREGS on rural labour market in select villages in Telangana and
Andhra Pradesh 2008–09a
Indicator Increased Decreased No
change
No clear
response
All
villages
1. Agricultural wages 70 Nil 2 5 77
2. Peak season shortage of
agricultural labour
62 Nil 6 9 77
3. Male–female agricultural wage
differential
Nil 71 Nil 6 77
4. Migration (a + b) Nil 51 20 6 77
a) Villages with migration before
NREGS
Nil 51 4 Nil 55
b) Villages with no migration
before NREGS
Nil Nil 12 Nil 12
aThe evidence is based on reports of Focus Group Discussions (FGD) of 77 villages (panchayats)
spread over 8 districts (Chittoor, Nalgonda, Medak, Ranga Reddy, Adilabad, Karimnagar and
Kurnool). These FGD reports are part of the two projects: Galab et al. (2008) and Reddy et al.
2014)
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3.5.1 Job Security
As a result of MGNREGA, not only did the rural labour have been able to obtain
increased wage rates but also their holding of job cards has given them a sense of
job security. The labours consider job cards as a measure of minimum security of
job that will be offered to them in future, especially in the off-season of agriculture
where the unemployment is rampant in all rural areas, especially in a dry region
with less access to irrigation water to grow crops all rounds the year. Because of
this perceived assurance of future availability of jobs and at assured wage rates, the
labour is empowered with increased bargaining power for setting their wage rates
even in other seasons than the case of without the minimum guarantee of
employment as was the case before implementation of MGNREGS in 2006.
This increased bargaining power of the agricultural labour, at least in relative
sense, is also one of the factors that the farmers community at large have felt their
reduced says in setting the rural wage and hiring the labour forces in many parts of
the year, and so has become a point of criticizing the MGNREGS activities by the
farming communities. These points have been expressed by many farmers during
the focus discussions with the farming communities regarding assessing the impact
of the MGNREGS. However, a more thorough sociological and political economy
related study on the topics may provide further insight on this social-cultural aspect
of the age-old patronizing type of relationship between farming communities and
agricultural labour forces in Indian sub-continent.
3.5.2 High Risk Perception of Farming
In general, a small farmer is not interested to depend on his all livelihood activities
in agriculture because of the inadequate income from farming and an insecurity of
return from the crop husbandry in general. In addition, the majority of the rural
youth in India are concerned that the hard work they put in agriculture is not
sufﬁcient to sustain their livelihoods. In the case of any of the natural calamities like
drought, hail storms, frost, and insect-pest and disease infestations, their labour and
investments in farming would be wasted.
Likewise, penetration of electronic media in the rural areas has changed the
attitude of the youths and turned them against agriculture. Their interest in agri-
culture is further waning, because of low expected returns from agricultural pro-
duces, and uncertainty in farm income. Therefore, for educated rural youth, farming
is a strenuous work for long durations, and is a low paid job compared to alternate
jobs for them in the non-farm sector. Thereby, in many parts of India, educated
rural youth and women, even unemployed ones, are usually do not attracted to
agricultural work due to drudgery and due to low social status attributed to agri-
cultural work than services and other sector employment.
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3.5.3 Perception of Different Social Groups
In the villages, at many times, large sections of the forward caste community of
agricultural families have often complained that the MGNREGA is the main reason
for the labour shortage in their communities. The authors have faced such feedback
and remarks from farmers during their case studies and focus group discussions at
several dryland villages in western and southern India. While agricultural labourers
are of the opinion that out-migration and work opportunities in non-farm sector are
opening labour market for higher wage employment, hence they are also
demanding higher wages for the agricultural sector in the rural areas; otherwise,
they prefer to go to non-farm sector jobs in the nearby cities. Hence, the notion of a
shortage of labour in large part of the rural India is not same for the farmers and
agricultural labourers and among different social groups within a rural community.
3.5.4 MGNREGA Wage Rates
In the ﬁrst phase of MGNREGS, the minimum wage was ﬁxed at ` 80 per day. It
was increased in Andhra Pradesh to ` 100 in 2009. Since the MGNREGS wage is
calculated on the basis of work done at the schedule of rates, the minimum wage
level is only indicative and the wage level could be higher or lower depending on
the nature of work and group efforts in completion of the work on time. But, in
Kuppanagar, a village used here as a case study, the average wage level obtained
has always been higher than the minimum indicated. Even in the earlier years when
the minimum wage was ` 80, Kuppanagar workers logged wages ranging from ` 93
to ` 126.
The results of the household survey showed average wage rate of ` 103 in
2009–10. In Kuppanagar, as in other places in the state, work is allotted to a group
calibrating the quantity equivalent to the schedule of rates that would fetch mini-
mum wage to each member. Often, some members of the group do not turn up but
yet the remaining ones complete the total allotted work and this increases the
average wage to a level higher than an indicated minimum wage. Wherever, the
workers are formed into Shrama Shakti Sangams (SSS), as in Kuppanagar, there is
a better motivation to work as a team and complete the work allotted at a time, even
if some members do not turn up. The result is the average wage of the group is then
higher than the minimum wage.
Besides, the average wages are paid equally to men and women. The average
MGNREGS wages logged by Kuppanagar workers are higher than local agricul-
tural wages, especially for women. The impact of MGNREGS wages is felt in two
ways. First, overall agricultural wages have increased. Male wages in agriculture
increased from Rs. 80 before MGNREGS to ` 100 in 2008–09, and female agri-
cultural wages increased from ` 50 to ` 80. The male–female wage gap has
declined substantively. The hours of agricultural work also have declined and it is
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invariably half a day work at the wages mentioned above. In the second half of the
day, the same agricultural labours have also worked on farm on piece rate basis.
The net impact on agriculture is higher wage costs.
The feedbacks offarmers in the groupdiscussions held by the authors have revealed
an interesting pattern. Regardless of the social group,most of theMGNREGSworkers
are also small and marginal farmers and they too feel the impact of rising agricultural
wages on their farms, but marginally, because of two reasons. First, their earnings,
especially those of women, from MGNREGS are substantially higher now than the
case of 5–6 years before the implementation of MGNREGS.
Second, they have substantially gained by way of improved productivity of their
land due to MGNREGS sponsored land development works on their private lands. In
many cases, after improvement of the land development work, even the value of land
has become double within a year. Therefore, the small-marginal farmers do not com-
plain much about rising wages recently, as they also get paid on increased wage rate
now. The landless workers, in fact, acknowledge rising agricultural wages. However,
their main complaint is about the steep rise in prices of essential commodities.
The response of relatively bigger farmers, normally non-participants in
MGNREGS, is about the rising agricultural wages. Interestingly, in many villages,
they do not complain about the MGNREGS as such, since most of them beneﬁted
from rising water table and increase in yield of their wells and bore wells due to
MGNREGS works in the villages, especially due to de-silting of tanks and ponds
and construction of a number of percolation tanks. These relatively bigger farmers
have been repeatedly making a plea that half of their agricultural work and wages
could be shared under MGNREGS. Paradoxically, they have developed a
vested-interest in MGNREGS hoping their wage costs would be shared under the
Scheme and, the political forces appear to be nursing this hope!
3.5.5 Agricultural Wages
At the time of the ﬁeldwork during 2008–09, the MGNREGS minimum wage for
both male and female workers was ` 80. In some of the villages, the male agri-
cultural wage was equal or marginally more than the MGNREGS wage rate, but the
female agricultural wage level was much lower in almost all the villages. The
introduction of MGNREGS increased the demand for labour in rural areas and
resulted in increase in agricultural wages for both male and female workers.
The rise in female agricultural wages, which were at much lower level, was
much steeper than the rate of increase in male wage rates. As a result, the difference
between male–female agricultural wages declined substantially in almost all vil-
lages (71) studied. An evaluation based on a large sample drawn from nine districts
of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh shows 43% increase in wages in 2011–11 from
the time when the inception of the scheme was done in 2005/06 (GoAP 2011).
The Telangana experience of the high, average and low performance in
MGNREGS employment, wage rates and household earnings is highly instructive
92 D. Narasimha Reddy et al.
and worthwhile presenting here as a summary statement (Reddy 2011; Reddy et al.
2014). While, the relatively high average wage rate for the state as a whole could be
attributed to state level political and administrative commitment and initiatives, the
high and the low observed at the grassroots level is for most part a result of the
presence or absence of participatory governance at the Panchayat level (Table 3.5).
3.5.6 Food Insecurity and MGNREGA
The experiences of Kuppanagar and Makkarajpet show what difference effective
implementation of MGNREGS could make to food insecurity in dryland areas.
While best performing Kuppanagar may show that hunger is a thing of the past, in
poor performing Makkarajpet 85% still feel that they have to suffer the privation.
While there has been an improvement in the consumption of food and reduced food
insecurity, but everywhere there was growing concern about rising prices.
There are interesting instances reported in FGDs which reveal varying degrees of
impact depending on the local conditions and the performance of MGNREGS. For
instance, the ﬁve villages in Karimnagar district report that MGNREGS has no
impact on food insecurity, meaning, Karimnagar, being agriculturally prosperous
district did have higher levels of employment, wages and levels of consumption of
food and hence MGNREGS did not make any difference. At the same time there is
Adilabad, a relatively backward district but here too, ironically, MGNREGS did not
make much difference to food insecurity. It is because of poor implementation of
the MGNREGS in the district, no assured employment, low earnings from the
scheme and continued migration which together perpetuate low levels of food
consumption.
Table 3.5 Employment and earnings under high, average and low MGNREGS performance in
Telangana (2009–10)
Indicator Kuppanagar Village
(High)
State
average
Makkarajpet
village
(Low)Sample
households
All
households
1. Average person days of
employment per household
161a 84 65 31
2. Average wage per person day (`) 103 110 92 86
3. Average annual MGNREGS
earnings per household (`.)
16,137 9,240 5,980 2,781
4. MGNREGS earnings as % of
poverty threshold income
(Tendulkar poverty line)
40.0 23.0 14.9 6.9
aThe high number of days is due to combining drought relief work with MGNREGS in the village
during 2009–10
Source http://www.nrega.ap.gov.in and Household Sample Survey (Reddy 2011)
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In contrast, in Khammam district, where there were villages with food deﬁcit and
hunger before MGNREGS, reports show complete turnaround in food consumption
and security because of better implementation of MGNREGS, more employment,
earnings and access to food. In most of the villages besides improved consumption
levels in food, MGNREGS earnings have enabled the households to buy food in
lump sum quantities. There is also change in food habits and some households have
reported that they consume ‘tifﬁn’ for the breakfast.
A larger survey reports that large proportions of MGNREGS households are able
to buy chicken and meat (68%) and vegetables (58%) and for 87% of these
households MGNREGS has become a source of lean season employment. There are
moving instances of livelihood dilemmas of the poor that before MGNREGS their
incomes were too meagre to meet their own consumption requirements and
therefore, neglected the needs of the aged members of the household. MGNREGS
has enabled them to take better care of the aged parents. Some households reported
that they provide pocket money to parents to buy toddy and beedies (local
signature).
3.5.7 MGNREGA and Labour Shortage for Agriculture
Even before MGNREGS, in peak agricultural season labour shortage was experi-
enced in many villages. Of course, there were a few dryland villages where it was
shortage of work, than shortage of labour, which continues to be a problem. But
after MGNREGS, 62 out of 68 villages reported increase in labour shortage.
However, out 77 villages, only two villages reported that there was not any decline
in area under cultivation due to rise in wages or shortage of labour in the peak
season.
In Kupanagar village, there has actually been an increase in the area cultivated in
the last 2 years, due to MGNREGS investment in fallow and rainfed lands of SCs.
A number of strategies are being adopted to meet the changing labour market
situations which in turn are also leading to many changes in the nature of rural and
especially agricultural labour markets. Six villages reported labourbeing brought
from outside the village by paying transport charges in addition to wages. In three
villages wages were paid in advance to ensure labour supply in the peak season for
agriculture. There has been growing tendency towards piece rate or contracting out
of agricultural work than employing labour on daily wages.
Agricultural workers reported better bargaining power, better treatment at the
farm, visible change in the form of respect and less pressure at the place of work.
Besides a rise in wages, in most of the villages workers have been able to negotiate
reduced duration of agricultural working day. And the growing shift towards piece
rate or contract work on agriculture facilitated the change in the working day. There
has been increasing tendency in the MGNREGS working day to begin early in the
day by seven in the morning and terminate by one in the afternoon.
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There are instances where the workers take to agricultural work in the afternoon,
often on their own farms, after attending the MGNREGS work in the forenoon.
There is an emergence, in some villages, a dual mode of work in a given day with
MGNREGS work in the forenoon and agricultural work in the afternoon (Reddy
2011). The latter mostly on own farms. Such adjustments appear to soften the
shortages of agricultural labour. And the very working day is being redeﬁned due to
changes in the labour market brought about by MGNREGS.
3.5.8 Group Work
There are important changes in the nature of work, duration of working hours and
attitude to group work. Almost all work under MGNREGS is in the form of group
work. The workers in many places, like in Kuppanagar, are oraganized into ﬁxed
labour groups called Shramik Shakti Sangams (SSSs). The group formation,
imparting training to ‘mates’ of the groups and working together for over 2 years
appears to promote better awareness, solidarity and motivation to perform better.
The majority of groups with a few exceptions are groups of mixed castes.
There was considerable mutual understanding and sharing of work. The reaction
of workers to group work reveals some of the ﬁner elements of work, like work not
being looked upon mere drudgery or exploitation but as a positive involvement.
Worker’s response was that under group work, which often involves the entire adult
family members along with others, even hard work is not felt as difﬁcult work.
There is a sense of mutual sharing when old people and physically disabled are also
part of the group. This has been possible because some stronger members com-
pensate by taking more load and share wages equally. In the perception of workers,
there is also certain amount of dignity associated with MGNREGS, since it is
government work and no room for exploitation.
3.5.9 MGNREGS Calendar
Though there are reports elsewhere about mechanization of agriculture as a
response to labour shortage, there is no such perceptible change towards mecha-
nization as a response to MGNREGS in the villages of the eight districts discussed
here. But there is a widespread demand by farmers for stopping MGNREGS work
during the agricultural peak season. In fact, a number of Gram Panchayats have
evolved, through mutual negotiation, work calendar that avoids MGNREGS work
during the local agricultural peak season. Such adjustment is seen as a mutually
beneﬁcial measure that helps farmers to avoid labour shortage in the peak season
and workers to get NREGS work in the lean season and thus increase the overall
days of employment in a year.
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3.5.10 Migration
Of the 77 villages reported in Table 3.11, in twelve villages there was no migration
before or after MGNREGS. Of the remaining, in four villages there was not much
change in the migration situation even after the scheme and in six other villages,
there was no clarity in the information recorded. In the rest of the 55 villages, there
were varying degrees of decline in migration. Most of the decline is in distress
migration, but not in the emerging process of movement towards higher paying,
relatively high productivity non-agricultural work and often, rural to urban
mobility. At least four villages reported complete stoppage of distress migration.
Some villages in districts like Ranga Reddy reported decline in long-distance
distress migration to Mumbai and Pune. This is similar to the decline in migration
from drought-prone Mahabubnagar district which was well-documented elsewhere
(Sainath 2008). In many other villages, the participants in discussions observed that
there would be further decline in distress migration if MGNREGS work is provided
for longer periods at a time and if wages are paid without much delay. Their
arguments were well reasoned. They were conscious of the costs of migration
including raising informal loans at high interest rates to meet the expenses of
mobility, high rents and fuel costs in destinations, the ordeal of having to live in
sub-human conditions and the risk of their children missing a chance to go to
school.
The non-distress type of migration from these villages, which is not affected
much by MGNREGS, is of three types. One is the migration of male members of
the households for high paying non-agricultural work for relatively longer dura-
tions. For instance, from the villages of Kurnool district which borders Karnataka,
male members of the households migrate to Bellary to work in construction, mining
and other activities. The second type of non-distress migration that continues even
after MGNREGS is rural to rural migration from dryland areas to fertile areas for
agricultural work. For instance, from Mandals like Aspari in Kurnool district, entire
household members migrate to Guntur district during June–August to work in the
mirch (chilli) and tobacco ﬁelds where each migrating couple make as much as
` 500 per day.
These families return during September–October to their own villages to work in
agriculture, and some, even in MGNREGS. The third type of continuing migration
is—strictly speaking not migration—daily commuting to neighbouring towns. For
instance, in Kurnool district members of some rural households commute to
neighbouring towns like Allagadda to work in shops and other establishments
where the wages are high. Interestingly, some work in MGNREGS in their villages
in the forenoon, and commute in the afternoon to nearby towns to work in odd jobs
including vegetable and fruit vending. Another independent survey cutting across
81 villages in nine districts of A.P reports 44% reduction in migration (GoAP
2011).
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3.5.11 Extra Worker and Extra Employment Effect
A question often raised is, if there were to be substantial increase in employment
under MGNREGS, what would be the impact on agriculture? Would there be
shortage of labour for agriculture? Ora decline in the area cultivated due to shortage
of labour? The experience of Kuppanagar village, suggests that though initially
there were signs of shortage of labour, over the past three years there have been
interesting developments in the working hours and the working day. Gradually
there has been a shift in the daily work schedule of MGNREGS works. It is
increasingly now tending to be conﬁned to forenoon. With it, there is also a ten-
dency on the part of workers who are engaged in the forenoon to take up either
agriculture wage labour or own farm work in the afternoon.
As observed earlier, many workers earn MGNREGS wages in the forenoon and
also earn on agriculture in the second half of the day, thereby doubling their day
into two working and earning days. This is hard work but preferred by many
workers since there is a substantial increase in income. This is a clear extra
employment effect. The other factor contributing to extra worker effect is the
inducement of relatively higher wages for women in MGNREGS compared to
agriculture. Some women from certain social groups who did not perform wage
labour are participating in MGNREGS work. It is because of being ‘government’
work, not work for a contractor or a landowner which carried a social stigma for
certain social communities. Thus, the extra employment and worker effects together
appear to keep labour supply to agriculture from being greatly disturbed.
3.5.12 Need for Improvement and e-FMS
However, there are number of complaints on the functioning of MGNREGS from
the grassroots level participants. The complaints mainly relates to cases of job cards
not provided, misappropriation of funds, engagement of contractors, forgery of
muster roll, manipulation in job cards, underpayment of wages, non-payment of
wages, corruption and other irregularities, use of machinery, delay in payments,
etc., which needs to be addressed both at macro- and micro-level.
With a view to reduce above malpractices and to avoid bogus attendance and to
check instances of tempering and misuse of muster rolls, the e-Muster system has
been introduced. For smooth fund flow, the electronic Fund Management System
(e-FMS) has been introduced which would also reduce delays in payment of wages.
With a view to eliminate ghost beneﬁciaries and for a faster disbursement of wages,
it has been decided to link the payments under MGNREGA to Aadhaar numbers
300 Direct Beneﬁt Transfer (DBT) districts. Under this, payments will be routed
directly into the accounts of the beneﬁciaries using the electronic system. Already,
there are visible signs of reducing malpractices in a number of villages.
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3.6 Concluding Observations
There is a growing evidence of an increase in agricultural wages across the country
over the period between 2006–07 and 2011–12, in which the impact of
MGNREGA is considerable. This review has also revealed a steep increase in
female agriculture wages and a substantive decline in the male–female wage
gap. The search for information on the impact of MGNREGA on agricultural labour
markets leads to some evidence on labour shortage, changes in wages, speeding up
mechanization process, peak season adjustment of work or adoption of MGNREGA
calendar and migration.
The absolute decline in labour force in rural areas has tightened the rural labour
market leading to shortage of labour for farm operations. Thus, labour scarcity has
emerged as one of the major constraints to increase agricultural production in India.
Furthermore, the tightened labour market has offered, better bargaining power to
agricultural labourers, better treatment at the place of work, ability to negotiate the
duration of the working day and has initiated a growing shift towards piece rate or
contract work on agriculture facilitating change in the number of working days.
Based on macro-level results and micro-level evidence some policy interven-
tions are suggested—such as development of labour saving technologies and
machines to mitigate labour scarcity, an inclusive farm mechanization programme
especially for women and youth, strengthening rural–urban connectivity, social
protection for migrant labour and capacity building programmes for skill aug-
mentation. Further, a revision of the time-frame of MGNREGA work to create more
employment in the lean season has been recommended.
Based on the facts and ﬁgures presented earlier, some of the clear evidence on
the impact of MGNREGS relates to labour market emerging out of the study are
summarized as follows:
• Agricultural wages have increased across the country, in which the impact of
MGNREGS is considerable.
• The rate of increase in the female agricultural wage has been much higher than
male wages, and the historically high male-female differentials in agricultural
wages have declined substantially.
• The peak period labour shortages in agriculture are observed in several regions
and are resulting in a number of changes in working hours, working day and
MGNREGS work calendar.
• The tightening labour market has offered better bargaining power to agricultural
labourers, better treatment at the place of work and ability to negotiate the
duration of the working day.
• The terms of wages are increasingly tending towards piece rate contracts.
• The ongoing process of agricultural mechanization is hastened especially in
certain operations like ploughing and harvesting of paddy, chickpeas, wheat
even in backward states.
• A clear response to peak season agriculture labour shortage is the negotiated
MGNREGS calendar that avoids implementing works during agricultural peak
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and provides developmental works during the lean season. And such a time
schedule though not universal is welcomed by farmers as well as workers
wherever adopted.
• There is no evidence that there has been marked a decline in the area cultivated
either due to rise in agricultural wages or shortage of labour. On the contrary,
there are counteracting forces by way of ‘extra worker effect’ by drawing
especially women from certain social groups into the ‘government employment’
of MGNREGS wage work; and ‘extra area effect’ by making the some of the
fallow lands of the poor more productive.
• There is clear evidence that rise in wages is one of the contributing factors,
along with other rising input costs, to increasing costs of cultivation. While SC,
ST and other small-marginal farmers who are also participants in the
MGNREGS were not affected much, or in many cases gained considerably, the
better off farmers could face the rising costs partly through mechanization.
• One of the salutary effects of MGNREGS on poor rural households is the drastic
reduction in distress migration. But there is no reason to share the apprehension,
as expressed by some (Farrington et al. 2007), that the scheme ‘may discourage
them from moving to more economically dynamic areas’. Just as in favour of
decline in distress migration, there is equally strong evidence to show that
migration for higher wage work that lasts for relatively longer period in a year
remains unaffected and possibly would improve if skill formation and capacity
building activities that would improve human capabilities are also brought under
the MGNREGS.
• The worst affected are the small-marginal farmers who are neither participants in
the MGNREGS work nor beneﬁciaries of works on their private lands. This
section of the small-marginal farming community may not be small and face
serious crisis. In this context the Planning Commission’s proposal to make the
scheme more farmer-friendly by extending the coverage to some of the agri-
cultural operations, if designed properly, may address the problems of excluded
small-marginal farmers.
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